Abstract:What is progress and what is not progress? We can talk about progress in lots of different arenas; we will focus primarily on economic and scientific progress, but also make brief reference to cultural and moral progress. In our discussion, we want to distinguish, especially, between overall, long-term progress and narrower, shorter-term progress or regress. We will refer to these as “global” and “local” progress, respectively. Of course, one can also regress; therefore, we will also look at instances where progress, (...) along some dimension, slows or even moves backwards. Generally, such regress is local, and often still in a context of broader, global progress. In scientific progress, for example, there are many instances of short-term progress which, if not completely discarded or disproved, are at least substantially modified or fundamentally challenged. And yet, those research paths, even when later abandoned, still contributed to the overall progress of the field. In that sense, the regress (that is, rejection or modification of previous theories) is corrected by, but not in conflict with, the overall progress. In the case of economic progress, the concept of regress usually takes on a different form in which things that aren’t advancing progress don’t necessarily stop it, but are simply retarding progress — that is, making the rate of progress less efficient. The consequence, we suggest, is that when talking about economic progress, objections to certain consequences of economic progress (for instance, income inequality — a type of regress, in our terminology) should not be cordoned off and dealt with independently, but should be incorporated into the way we think about economic progress itself — as instances of local regress within a context of global progress. We explore the effects of these different relations between progress and regress to suggest some of the challenges those seeking to broaden the standard measure, GDP, to incorporate other social values of well-being will face moving forward. (shrink)

A principle endorsed by many theories of objective chance, and practically forced on us by the standard interpretation of the Kolmogorov semantics for chance, is the principle that when a proposition P has a chance, any proposition Q that is necessarily equivalent to P will have the same chance as P. Call this principle SUB (for the substitution of necessary equivalents into chance ascriptions). I will present some problems for a theory of chance, and will argue that the best way (...) to resolve these problems is to reject SUB, and similar principles e.g. for the chances of outcomes or the chances of events. Objective chance, it turns out, carves things more finely than necessary equivalence does. (shrink)

On the Lockean thesis one ought to believe a proposition if and only if one assigns it a credence at or above a threshold (Foley in Am Philos Q 29(2):111–124, 1992). The Lockean thesis, thus, provides a way of characterizing sets of all-or-nothing beliefs. Here we give two independent characterizations of the sets of beliefs satisfying the Lockean thesis. One is in terms of betting dispositions associated with full beliefs and one is in terms of an accuracy scoring system for (...) full beliefs. These characterizations are parallel to, but not merely derivative from, the more familiar Dutch Book (de Finetti in Theory of probability, vol 1, Wiley, London, 1974) and accuracy (Joyce in Philos Sci 65(4):575–603, 1998) arguments for probabilism. (shrink)

My paper provides reasons in support of the view that vague identity claims originate from a conflict between rigidity and precision in designation. To put this stricly, let x be the referent of the referential terms P and Q. Then, that the proposition “that any x being both a P and a Q” is vague involves that the semantic intuitions at work in P and Q reveal a conflict between P and Q being simultaneously rigid and precise designators. After having (...) shortly commented on an example of vague identity claim, I make the case for my proposal, by discussing how reference by baptism conflicts with descriptive attitudes towards understanding conceptual contents. (shrink)

People tend to contribute more—and think they have stronger obligations to contribute more—to rescuing an identified victim rather than a statistical one. Indeed, they are often disposed to contribute more to rescuing a single identified victim than a greater number of statistical ones. By an “identified victim,” I mean Terry Q., lying injured in the passenger seat of the wrecked automobile on the corner of Main Street and Broadway, or Jessica McClure, the child who fell into the Texas well in (...) 1987 and whose family was sent $700,000 in donations for her. We need not know their names, however, and we can accept a very minimal form of identification. By a “statistical victim,” I mean the person who, extrapolating from traffic records, will be in a similar, serious car accident tomorrow (and may then be identified), or the children who will fall into wells next year if we do not cap them better than we did the well that trapped Jessica. Does this disposition (or perceived obligation) have any normative force? I initially thought there could be no such normative force, but consequentialist and nonconsequentialist arguments, pro and con, have convinced me that reasonable people can disagree with each other. This disagreement poses a problem for political philosophy: how should policy choices take such disagreement into account? (shrink)

A dozen philosophers have recently groped for a formula to pick out coercive offers: when P proposes to give a benefit or withhold a harm for Q’s compliance, when does p’s proposal count as coercive? Five formulae are analyzed here. One account is completely “moralized,” claiming that we can’t pick out coercive offers without first settling questions of rights. Two accounts are completely “non-moral,” using as criterion a baseline of “What would in fact have happened” if P had not wanted (...) Q’s compliance. Finally, two accounts offer “two-baseline” accounts, asking “What should have happened?” and/or “What would have happened otherwise?” four accounts are found quite inadequate; the fifth account (my own earlier formula) is threatened by two odd counter cases. Finally, an alternative to “defining coercion” is sketched. (shrink)

A dozen philosophers have recently groped for a formula to pick out coercive offers: when P proposes to give a benefit or withhold a harm for Q’s compliance, when does p’s proposal count as coercive? Five formulae are analyzed here. One account is completely “moralized,” claiming that we can’t pick out coercive offers without first settling questions of rights. Two accounts are completely “non-moral,” using as criterion a baseline of “What would in fact have happened” if P had not wanted (...) Q’s compliance. Finally, two accounts offer “two-baseline” accounts, asking “What should have happened?” and/or “What would have happened otherwise?” four accounts are found quite inadequate; the fifth account (my own earlier formula) is threatened by two odd counter cases. Finally, an alternative to “defining coercion” is sketched. (shrink)

We prove the following algebraic characterization of elementary equivalence: $\equiv$ restricted to countable structures of finite type is minimal among the equivalence relations, other than isomorphism, which are preserved under reduct and renaming and which have the Robinson property; the latter is a faithful adaptation for equivalence relations of the familiar model theoretical notion. We apply this result to Friedman's fourth problem by proving that if L = L ωω (Q i ) i ∈ ω 1 is an (ω 1 (...) , ω)-compact logic satisfying both the Robinson consistency theorem on countable structures of finite type and the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem for some $\lambda for theories having ω 1 many sentences, then $\equiv_L = \equiv$ on such structures. (shrink)

Given an abstract logic L = L(Q i ) i ∈ I generated by a set of quantifiers Q i , one can construct for each type τ a topological space S τ exactly as one constructs the Stone space for τ in first-order logic. Letting T be an arbitrary directed set of types, the set $S_T = \{(S_\tau, \pi^\tau_\sigma)\mid\sigma, \tau \in T, \sigma \subset \tau\}$ is an inverse topological system whose bonding mappings π τ σ are naturally determined by (...) the reduct operation on structures. We relate the compactness of L to the topological properties of S T . For example, if I is countable then L is compact iff for every τ each clopen subset of S τ is of finite type and S τ is homeomorphic to $\underset{lim}S_T$ , where T is the set of finite subtypes of τ. We finally apply our results to concrete logics. (shrink)

Our purpose is to formulate a complete logic of propositions that takes into account the fact that propositions are both senses provided with truth values and contents of conceptual thoughts. In our formalization, propositions are more complex entities than simple functions from possible worlds into truth values. They have a structure of constituents (a content) in addition to truth conditions. The formalization is adequate for the purposes of the logic of speech acts. It imposes a stronger criterion of propositional identity (...) than strict equivalence. Two propositions P and Q are identical if and only if, for any illocutionary force F, it is not possible to perform with success a speech act of the form F(P) without also performing with success a speech act of the form F(Q). Unlike hyperintensional logic, our logic of propositions is compatible with the classical Boolean laws of propositional identity such as the symmetry and the associativity of conjunction and the reduction of double negation. (shrink)

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein maintains that “The world is all that is the case.” Some philosophers have seen an advantage in introducing into a formal language either a constant which will represent the world, or an operator, e.g., ‘Max’, such that indicates that p gives a complete description of the actual world, of the world at some instant of time, or of a possible world. Such propositions are called world propositions, possible world propositions, or maximal propositions. For us, a maximal (...) proposition is a possible world proposition; it gives a complete description of one way the world might be. A maximal proposition p is not logically false, and for any proposition q, either p entails q or p entails not-q. (shrink)

We introduce a family of local ranks $D_Q$ depending on a finite set Q of pairs of the form $(\varphi (x,y),q(y)),$ where $\varphi (x,y)$ is a formula and $q(y)$ is a global type. We prove that in any NSOP $_1$ theory these ranks satisfy some desirable properties; in particular, $D_Q(x=x)<\omega $ for any finite tuple of variables x and any Q, if $q\supseteq p$ is a Kim-forking extension of types, then $D_Q(q) (...) Kim-non-forking extension, then $D_Q(q)=D_Q(p)$ for every Q that involves only invariant types whose Morley powers are -stationary. We give natural examples of families of invariant types satisfying this property in some NSOP $_1$ theories. We also answer a question of Granger about equivalence of dividing and dividing finitely in the theory $T_\infty $ of vector spaces with a generic bilinear form. We conclude that forking equals dividing in $T_\infty $, strengthening an earlier observation that $T_\infty $ satisfies the existence axiom for forking independence. Finally, we slightly modify our definitions and go beyond NSOP $_1$ to find out that our local ranks are bounded by the well-known ranks: the inp-rank (burden), and hence, in particular, by the dp-rank. Therefore, our local ranks are finite provided that the dp-rank is finite, for example, if T is dp-minimal. Hence, our notion of rank identifies a non-trivial class of theories containing all NSOP $_1$ and NTP $_2$ theories. (shrink)

This is a collection of essays by analytic philosophers who examine the sort of argument attributed to Kant in his refutation of Humes skepticism. This sort of argument is called transcendental and has the following structure: p; it would not be possible that p if we did not think that q; therefore we must think that q; therefore it is true that q.. If p stands for thought or experience, then this sort of argument is transcendental in that it argues (...) that something is required for thinking about or experiencing not merely particular things, but for thinking about or experiencing anything at all. The use of transcendental arguments by various figures in the history of philosophy is examined in these essays. However, the authors are primarily concerned with the use of such arguments by various recent analytic philosophers. The essays are written both by defenders of transcendental arguments, who are interested in refuting either Humean or Cartesian skepticism, and by detractors of these arguments. Barry Stroud is the prime example of the latter. Here the main debate concerns whether one can move from some undeniable facts about experience or the psychological realm to some facts about nonpsychological reality. Hence truth-directed transcendental arguments seem more controversial than belief-directed ones. Or again, critics of transcendental arguments very often focus on the legitimacy of drawing conclusions about the nature of reality from premises about the nature of thought. (shrink)

Bayesians take “definite” or “single-case” probabilities to be basic. Definite probabilities attach to closed formulas or propositions. We write them here using small caps: PROB(P) and PROB(P/Q). Most objective probability theories begin instead with “indefinite” or “general” probabilities (sometimes called “statistical probabilities”). Indefinite probabilities attach to open formulas or propositions. We write indefinite probabilities using lower case “prob” and free variables: prob(Bx/Ax). The indefinite probability of an A being a B is not about any particular A, but rather about the (...) property of being an A. In this respect, its logical form is the same as that of relative frequencies. For instance, we might talk about the probability of a human baby being female. That probability is about human babies in general — not about individuals. If we examine a baby and determine conclusively that she is female, then the definite probability of her being female is 1, but that does not alter the indefinite probability of human babies in general being female. Most objective approaches to probability tie probabilities to relative frequencies in some way, and the resulting probabilities have the same logical form as the relative frequencies. That is, they are indefinite probabilities. The simplest theories identify indefinite probabilities with relative frequencies.3 It is often objected that such “finite frequency theories” are inadequate because our probability judgments often diverge from relative frequencies. For example, we can talk about a coin being fair (and so the indefinite probability of a flip landing heads is 0.5) even when it is flipped only once and then destroyed (in which case the relative frequency is either 1 or 0). For understanding such indefinite probabilities, it has been suggested that we need a notion of probability that talks about possible instances of properties as well as actual instances.. (shrink)

We study completely decomposable torsion-free abelian groups of the form $\mathcal{G}_S := \oplus_{n \in S} \mathbb{Q}_{p_n}$ for sets $S \subseteq \omega$. We show that $\mathcal{G}_S$has a decidable copy if and only if S is $\Sigma^0_2$and has a computable copy if and only if S is $\Sigma^0_3$.

This article aims to contextualize a short Qurʾānic passage – Q 30:2‒5 – with reference to Jewish and Christian materials that have not hitherto been deployed for this purpose. The article builds on the findings of recent scholarship, which reads this passage eschatologically rather than historically, and argues that there are, in fact, two texts that require contextualization: 1) The Qurʾānic verses themselves (which refer only to the fate of “the Romans”); and 2) The early exegetical traditions on these verses (...) (which often add “the Persians” to the eschatological drama). Furthermore, it is argued that the Biblical book of Daniel, and its interpretation in late antiquity, contributed both to the verses themselves and to their exegesis. (shrink)

It is common to hear talk of the aim of belief and to find philosophers appealing to that aim for numerous explanatory purposes. What belief 's aim explains depends, of course, on what that aim is. Many hold that it is somehow related to truth, but there are various ways in which one might specify belief 's aim using the notion of truth. In this article, by considering whether they can account for belief 's standard of correctness and the epistemic (...) norms governing belief, I argue against certain prominent specifications of belief 's aim given in terms of truth, and advance a neglected alternative. (shrink)

Geared to preparing students to make the transition from solving problems to proving theorems, this text teachs them the techniques needed to read and write proofs. The book begins with the basic concepts of logic and set theory, to familiarize students with the language of mathematics and how it is interpreted. These concepts are used as the basis for a step-by-step breakdown of the most important techniques used in constructing proofs. To help students construct their own proofs, this new edition (...) contains over 200 new exercises, selected solutions, and an introduction to Proof Designer software. No background beyond standard high school mathematics is assumed. Previous Edition Hb (1994) 0-521-44116-1 Previous Edition Pb (1994) 0-521-44663-5. (shrink)

The _Physics_ is a foundational work of western philosophy, and the crucial one for understanding Aristotle's views on matter, form, essence, causation, movement, space, and time. This richly annotated, scrupulously accurate, and consistent translation makes it available to a contemporary English reader as no other does—in part because it fits together seamlessly with other closely associated works in the New Hackett Aristotle series, such as the _Metaphysics_, _De Anima_, and forthcoming _De Caelo_ and _On Coming to Be and Passing Away_. (...) Eventually the series will include all of Aristotle's works. Sequentially numbered endnotes provide the information most needed at each juncture, while a detailed Index of Terms indicates places where focused discussion of key notions occurs. An illuminating general Introduction describes the book that lies ahead, explaining what sort of work it is and what sorts of evidence it relies on. (shrink)

This article seeks to contribute to our understanding of a short Qurʾānic passage, Q 85:4‒10, which concerns the fate of the enigmatic Aṣḥāb al-Ukhdūd. It is argued that the ‘eschatological’ and ‘historical’ readings of this passage, which have generally been taken to be mutually exclusive options for its interpretation, are both indispensable for a full contextualization of the verses in question. Furthermore, regarding the historical reading of the passage, it is argued that the verses refer to the events recorded in (...) Daniel 3, rather than to the Martyrs of Najrān episode that most exegetes (and many modern scholars) opt for. Finally, a new etymology for the word Ukhdūd is proposed. (shrink)

In _Buddhists, Brahmins, and Belief_, Dan Arnold examines how the Brahmanical tradition of Purva Mimamsa and the writings of the seventh-century Buddhist Madhyamika philosopher Candrakirti challenged dominant Indian Buddhist views of epistemology. Arnold retrieves these two very different but equally important voices of philosophical dissent, showing them to have developed highly sophisticated and cogent critiques of influential Buddhist epistemologists such as Dignaga and Dharmakirti. His analysis--developed in conversation with modern Western philosophers like William Alston and J. L. Austin--offers an innovative (...) reinterpretation of the Indian philosophical tradition, while suggesting that pre-modern Indian thinkers have much to contribute to contemporary philosophical debates. In logically distinct ways, Purva Mimamsa and Candrakirti's Madhyamaka opposed the influential Buddhist school of thought that emphasized the foundational character of perception. Arnold argues that Mimamsaka arguments concerning the "intrinsic validity" of the earliest Vedic scriptures are best understood as a critique of the tradition of Buddhist philosophy stemming from Dignaga. Though often dismissed as antithetical to "real philosophy," Mimamsaka thought has affinities with the reformed epistemology that has recently influenced contemporary philosophy of religion. Candrakirti's arguments, in contrast, amount to a principled refusal of epistemology. Arnold contends that Candrakirti marshals against Buddhist foundationalism an approach that resembles twentieth-century ordinary language philosophy--and does so by employing what are finally best understood as transcendental arguments. The conclusion that Candrakirti's arguments thus support a metaphysical claim represents a bold new understanding of Madhyamaka. (shrink)

An enquiry into plant consciousness requires, on the one hand, taking into account recent experiments in plant biology and, on the other hand, refining the theoretical framework of behaviour and the various degrees of cognition. The main goal of this contribution is to advance such a framework by comparing classical animal and human cognition approaches with the theories of minimal cognition. This leads us to interpret more carefully the various plant activities and to highlight the limits of classical theories of (...) zoocentric cognition. In particular, the article shows that the notions of cognition and consciousness are often abusively confused, and with that of behaviour. Once this ambiguity is removed, it is possible to better distinguish several meanings of consciousness and to evaluate their relevance to plant activities. (shrink)

Many have criticized liberalism for being too individualistic, but few have offered an alternative that goes beyond a vague affirmation of the need for community. In this entertaining book, written in dialogue form, Daniel Bell fills this gap, presenting and defending a distinctively communitarian theory against the objections of a liberal critic. Drawing on the works of such thinkers as Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, and Alasdair MacIntyre, Bell attacks liberalism's individualistic view of the person by pointing to our social (...) embeddedness. He develops Michael Walzer's idea that political thinking involves the interpretation of shared meanings emerging from the political life of a community, and intelligently rebuts criticism that this approach damages his case by being conservative and relativistic. Communitarianism and Its Critics is a provocative defense of a distinctly communitarian theory which will stimulate interest and debate among scholars and students of political theory as well as those approaching the subject for the first time. (shrink)

There has recently been a focus on the question of statue removalism. This concerns what to do with public history statues that honour or otherwise celebrate ethically bad historical figures. The specific wrongs of these statues have been understood in terms of derogatory speech, inapt honours, or supporting bad ideologies. In this paper I understand these bad public history statues as history, and identify a distinctive class of public history-specific wrongs. Specifically, public history plays an important identity-shaping role, and bad (...) public history can commit specifically ontic injustice. Understanding bad public history in terms of ontic injustice helps understand not just to address bad public history statues, but also understand the value of public history more broadly. (shrink)

Premodern Buddhists are sometimes characterized as veritable "mind scientists" whose insights anticipate modern research on the brain and mind. Aiming to complicate this story, Dan Arnold confronts a significant obstacle to popular attempts at harmonizing classical Buddhist and modern scientific thought: since most Indian Buddhists held that the mental continuum is uninterrupted by death, they would have no truck with the idea that everything about the mental can be explained in terms of brain events. Nevertheless, a predominant stream of Indian (...) Buddhist thought, associated with the seventh-century thinker Dharmakirti, turns out to be vulnerable to arguments modern philosophers have leveled against physicalism. By characterizing the philosophical problems commonly faced by Dharmakirti and contemporary philosophers such as Jerry Fodor and Daniel Dennett, Arnold seeks to advance an understanding of both first-millennium Indian arguments and contemporary debates on the philosophy of mind. The issues center on what modern philosophers have called _intentionality_--the fact that the mind can be about other things. Tracing an account of intentionality through Kant, Wilfrid Sellars, and John McDowell, Arnold argues that intentionality cannot, in principle, be explained in causal terms. Elaborating some of Dharmakirti's central commitments, Arnold shows that despite his concern to refute physicalism, Dharmakirti's causal explanations of the mental mean that modern arguments from intentionality cut as much against his project as they do against physicalist philosophies of mind. This is evident in the arguments of some of Dharmakirti's contemporaneous Indian critics, whose critiques exemplify the same logic as modern arguments from intentionality. Elaborating these various strands of thought, Arnold shows that seemingly arcane arguments among first-millennium Indian thinkers can illuminate matters still very much at the heart of contemporary philosophy. (shrink)